By Professor Toghrul Ismayil, Head of the Department of Political History at Kahramanmaraş University.

The victory of Nikol Pashinyan in Armenia’s parliamentary elections can be regarded as one of the key events shaping the future development of the post-conflict period in the South Caucasus. This outcome signifies not only the preservation of the domestic political balance within Armenia itself but also sends important signals regarding the future geopolitical and geo-economic structure of the region. Especially within the new regional reality that emerged after 2020, Yerevan is effectively faced with a choice between two strategic directions: a return to a policy of revanchism or a transition toward a model of regional integration and economic transformation.

Pashinyan’s victory indicates that support for the second scenario is gradually growing within Armenian society. Armenia is increasingly recognizing that prolonged geopolitical isolation and economic blockade have become a serious strategic burden for the state. Demographic challenges, a shortage of investment, economic dependence, and a security crisis are forcing the Armenian leadership to adapt to new regional realities.

In this context, the model of regional cooperation promoted by Azerbaijan and Turkey is becoming for Armenia not merely a political choice but effectively a strategy for economic survival.

After 2020, one of the most significant geopolitical changes in the South Caucasus was the transformation of the Azerbaijani-Turkish strategic tandem into the main center of regional integration. This axis, which also includes Georgia, has formed an alternative regional system in the fields of energy, transportation, security, and logistics. Armenia, however, remained outside this integration framework for many years.

At the current stage, the possibility of Armenia joining this platform appears far more realistic than in previous years. In particular, the issue of opening communications through the Zangezur direction is becoming one of the key geo-economic projects capable of shaping the future of the entire region.

The project that Azerbaijan refers to as the “Zangezur Corridor” is not merely a matter of transportation connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. In a broader sense, it concerns the creation of physical connectivity within the Turkic World, the strengthening of the Middle Corridor, and the establishment of alternative trade and transportation routes across Eurasia. If fully implemented, the project could create a new strategic logistics platform stretching from China through Central Asia, the Caspian region, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to Europe.

Armenia’s participation in this process is of particular importance. Whereas it was previously excluded from the regional transit system, under the new conditions it has an opportunity to become an important transit state. This, in turn, could have both direct and indirect multi-billion-dollar impacts on the Armenian economy.

Specifically, the transportation of grain products from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries through Armenia to Turkey and onward to Mediterranean markets, as well as the supply of Azerbaijani petroleum products to the Armenian market, could create a new model of economic interdependence. Such a model could help soften the traditional atmosphere of political confrontation and facilitate a transition toward a regional security system based on economic cooperation.

To some extent, this process resembles the European model of post-war integration, where economic cooperation became the foundation of political stability. Just as the European Coal and Steel Community later became the basis of the European Union, cooperation in energy, transportation, and logistics in the South Caucasus could likewise become the foundation of future regional stability.

In this context, the American factor must also be taken into account. In recent years, one of the key priorities of U.S. policy in the South Caucasus has been the gradual reduction of the region’s dependence on Russia and Iran. For this reason, communication and economic projects between Azerbaijan and Armenia supported by American political circles are acquiring not only regional but also global strategic significance.

It is particularly noteworthy that some approaches promoted during the presidency of Donald Trump were based on the idea of using economic interconnectedness as a tool for reducing political confrontation. Washington believes that long-term stability in the South Caucasus can be ensured not only through a military-political balance but also through mechanisms of economic interdependence.

For this reason, Armenia’s integration into the Middle Corridor is also of strategic interest to the West. The Middle Corridor is not merely a regional project but an alternative Eurasian trade route emerging as an alternative to northern transit routes. Following the Russia–Ukraine conflict, the significance of this route has increased substantially due to the growing risks associated with northern transit corridors.

Turkey likewise seeks to become one of the key geo-economic centers of this process. For Ankara, the Middle Corridor is not only an economic project but also part of a broader strategy for the integration of the Turkic World. Armenia’s inclusion in this system could strengthen Turkey’s position within the framework of its regional soft-power policy.

The positive signals Turkey has sent to Armenia in recent years also demonstrate Ankara’s interest in normalizing relations. Turkish leaders have openly stated that normalization could create economic benefits for all states in the region. In particular, the opening of borders for Armenia would mean access both to the Turkish market and to new opportunities for reaching European markets.

At the same time, Turkish-Armenian normalization is not viewed separately from Azerbaijani-Armenian reconciliation. Ankara acts in close strategic coordination with Baku and regards the development of relations with Armenia as an integral component of the broader peace process in the South Caucasus.

Nevertheless, significant obstacles remain on the path toward this optimistic scenario. The primary factor is the concern of Russia and Iran regarding changes in the regional geopolitical balance.

For decades, Russia has been the principal architect of the South Caucasus security system. The Karabakh conflict was one of the most important instruments for maintaining Russian influence in the region. The substantial changes that occurred after 2020, as well as Armenia’s attempts to pursue a more multi-vector foreign policy, have weakened the previous mechanisms of Russian influence.

Moscow believes that closer relations among Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, as well as the strengthening of the Middle Corridor, could in the long term threaten Russia’s geopolitical position across Eurasia. For this reason, the Kremlin remains cautious regarding the prospect of full regional integration.

Iran’s position is even more complex. For Tehran, Armenia has traditionally served as a geopolitical buffer limiting the expansion of Turkish and Azerbaijani influence in the region. In addition, Iran is concerned about a reduction in its own transit significance.

Of particular importance for Tehran is the International North–South Transport Corridor, which Iranian leaders regard as one of the country’s principal geo-economic instruments. Consequently, the strengthening of the Middle Corridor and Armenia’s integration into that system are perceived by Iran as the emergence of an alternative geo-economic model.

Nevertheless, despite existing contradictions, the economic logic of the region is gradually beginning to prevail over the confrontational model of the past. If Armenia succeeds in adequately assessing the changed realities, it could transform itself from a state generating regional problems into an important participant in the South Caucasus transit and integration system.

In that case, the region would gain an opportunity to move to a qualitatively new stage of development. Further expansion of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars transportation line, the creation of new road and railway routes, and enhanced access to European markets through Turkey could become possible.

Thus, Pashinyan’s electoral victory represents not only a domestic political event for Armenia but also an important indicator of the future geopolitical structure of the South Caucasus. If Yerevan ultimately chooses the path of regional integration, the South Caucasus could gradually transform from a space of chronic conflict into one of the new centers of Eurasian cooperation and transit.

However, the realization of such a scenario requires the abandonment of revanchist policies, respect for the principles of sovereignty, and the prioritization of economic cooperation over political manipulation. Otherwise, the region once again risks becoming an arena for great-power competition, missing a historic opportunity to establish a sustainable system of peace and cooperation.