By Ali K. Asker, Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies
University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

As emphasized, these are expectations rather than predictions. International politics is inherently dynamic, and it is impossible to forecast fixed outcomes with certainty. Policies evolve in response to changing geopolitical conditions, domestic political calculations, and unforeseen crises. Nevertheless, based on current developments and signals, it is possible to outline the likely direction of a Trump administration policy toward the South Caucasus over the next three years.

A key indicator is the August 2025 meeting between the political leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia at the White House. This meeting signaled renewed and visible U.S. engagement in the region. One important outcome was the agreement between the United States, Azerbaijan, and Armenia to cooperate on transportation routes through the Zangezur corridor, under a new initiative referred to as Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Although the full details of this initiative are not yet publicly available, it appears to aim at facilitating regional connectivity, trade, and infrastructure development.

For such cooperation to become sustainable, Azerbaijan and Armenia must formally sign a comprehensive peace treaty that legally ends hostilities and institutionalizes normalization. While limited cooperation has already begun, with Azerbaijan supplying energy to Armenia and permitting the transit of goods through its territory, a binding peace agreement would provide the necessary legal and political foundation for long-term stability. In this context, U.S. involvement appears designed not only to facilitate reconciliation but also to strategically limit the influence of Russia and Iran – two regional powers that have historically benefited from instability and unresolved conflict in the South Caucasus.

Both Russia and Iran have long maintained significant leverage in the region. Russia has exercised political, military, and economic influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while Iran has played a complex balancing role shaped by its own security and geopolitical concerns. Neither Moscow nor Tehran is likely to welcome deeper American involvement in the regional projects. However, current geopolitical realities – including Russia’s broader international constraints and shifting regional alignments – create an opportunity for external state actors such as the United States to expand their role.

Azerbaijan and Armenia, for different reasons, appear interested in reducing their dependence on Russia. For Azerbaijan, the motivation is largely strategic diversification and balancing. Under Prime Minister Pashinyan, Armenia has increasingly pursued a more pro-Western foreign policy orientation, particularly in response to growing tensions with Moscow. In this context, interest in alternative partnerships has expanded. In such an environment, the United States may position itself as a guarantor of new regional arrangements and as a counterweight to both Russian and Iranian influence.

It should be noted that U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus is not entirely new. Since the 1990s, Washington has maintained involvement, particularly in Azerbaijan’s energy sector and regional pipeline projects. However, what appears different now is the attempt to assume a more direct political and strategic role in facilitating Armenian Azerbaijani normalization and in shaping emerging transportation corridors.

If the United States seeks to provide security guarantees for new transport routes such as TRIPP, even a limited security presence would significantly alter the regional balance. Such involvement would symbolically and practically reduce Russian dominance in security matters. Whether this would involve formal deployments, monitoring mechanisms, or indirect security arrangements remains unclear. However, even modest U.S. security engagement would carry substantial geopolitical implications.

If successful, this policy could transform the political and economic environment of the South Caucasus. Enhanced connectivity between Azerbaijan and Armenia could expand toward Türkiye and further into Central Asia, integrating the region more closely into transcontinental trade networks. In this scenario, the United States would position itself as a strategic architect of regional integration, while also seeking economic benefits from infrastructure development and energy cooperation.

At the same time, Washington’s broader strategic objective may include preventing not only Russian and Iranian dominance but also limiting China’s long-term influence in regional infrastructure projects. The South Caucasus occupies a strategically important position linking Europe and Asia, and major powers increasingly view connectivity corridors as instruments of geopolitical influence.

However, several significant challenges could constrain this strategy. First, Russia is unlikely to accept a rapid erosion of its influence without response. Moscow retains deep economic ties with Azerbaijan and remains an important trade partner. Armenia, despite recent tensions, continues to depend on Russia in key sectors, including security and energy. Russian countermeasures could include economic pressure, political influence operations, or attempts to disrupt normalization efforts.

Second, Armenia’s strategic diversification is constrained by geography and history. Although improved relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan could provide alternatives to Russian dependency, deep historical grievances complicate rapid normalization. Political courage and sustained diplomatic engagement are required from all sides to transform historical mistrust into practical cooperation.

Third, U.S. policy itself may face internal constraints. A Trump administration traditionally prioritizes transactional and interest-based diplomacy. Therefore, engagement in the South Caucasus would likely be driven by strategic and economic calculations rather than normative commitments. If tangible benefits – security influence, economic returns, or geopolitical leverage – do not materialize quickly, sustained engagement may weaken.

Nevertheless, if a peace treaty is signed within the next year or two and infrastructure cooperation begins to generate visible economic gains, a new regional dynamic is likely to emerge. Increased trade, cross-border connectivity, and diversified partnerships would gradually reduce incentives for renewed conflict. In that scenario, the South Caucasus could enter a new phase characterized by strategic realignment under partial U.S. leadership.

In conclusion, expectations for the Trump administration’s policy in the South Caucasus center on expanded strategic engagement, support for Armenian Azerbaijani normalization, development of transportation corridors, and containment of Russian and Iranian influence. Success will depend on the willingness of regional actors to institutionalize peace, the ability of the United States to sustain commitment, and the reactions of competing powers. While uncertainty remains high, the next three years could represent a pivotal period in reshaping the geopolitical orientation of the region.