By Alexey Naumov, Expert at Russia’s International Affairs Council
For Moscow, the South Caucasus is not a peripheral theatre. It is a direct strategic neighborhood linking the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Middle East and Central Asia. Russia’s central objective is therefore simple: the region should not be transformed into another front line of bloc competition. It should be a zone of sovereign regional responsibility, where Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia deal first of all with one another and with their immediate neighbors — Russia, Iran and Türkiye.
This is the meaning of the 3+3 formula. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described it in practical terms after the Second Karabakh War: Azerbaijan advocated broader regional cooperation, including connectivity, and “this formula, 3+3, was introduced,” meaning “Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia as South Caucasus, Turkiye, Iran and Russia.” Russian diplomacy has framed the same idea as a regional cooperation platform bringing together the three South Caucasus states and their close neighbours, Russia, Iran and Türkiye, precisely to ensure that the region’s problems are resolved by the states of the region themselves.
After the Washington agreements of August 2025, Moscow’s regional policy can no longer be framed as a simple return to the trilateral arrangements of 2020–2022. The Washington Declaration recorded the initialing of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace text, the joint appeal to close the OSCE Minsk Process, and the launch of the TRIPP connectivity framework through Armenian territory. President Putin later acknowledged this new reality directly: speaking to Nikol Pashinyan in Moscow in April 2026, he said that, thanks to the efforts of Pashinyan and President Aliyev, and with the active participation of the U.S. President, relations had reached “the level of stabilization,” while transport routes were being unblocked. Yet stabilization is not the same as the strategic outsourcing of the South Caucasus. For Russia, the essential question after Washington is whether the new peace architecture will be embedded in regional balance — involving Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Russia, Iran and Türkiye — or whether it will be used to turn Armenia into a platform for extra-regional political and security influence.
This is where the first Russian maxim begins: Moscow welcomes peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but it will oppose the use of that peace process as an entry point for external political engineering. Practical projects such as TRIPP can be assessed through the prism of sovereignty, transparency and regional benefit. But the institutional cooptation of Armenia by the European Union — especially in the political and security spheres — is a different matter. It risks replacing regional responsibility with external tutelage and turning the South Caucasus into another arena of bloc rivalry.
The European Union’s Armenian track is different because it increasingly has a political and security dimension. The EU Mission in Armenia has been extended until February 2027, with a budget of more than €44 million and more than 200 personnel. In February 2026, the EU-Armenia Political and Security Dialogue reaffirmed cooperation and alignment in foreign, security and defence policy, noted European Peace Facility support worth €30 million since 2024, and welcomed Armenia’s increasing alignment with EU foreign-policy positions. For Brussels this may be partnership-building. For Moscow it looks like the gradual cooptation of Armenia into an external political-security architecture.
This explains the sharpness of Russian Foreign Ministry language. Moscow has argued that regional and bilateral issues in the South Caucasus should be addressed in accordance with the “principle of regional responsibility” agreed in the aforementioned 3+3 format, and has called on external players to respect these arrangements. Russian officials have also warned that the EU mission in Armenia risks turning the region into an arena of geopolitical rivalry. Whether one accepts this view or not, it is the real Russian assessment and will shape Russian policy.
The second Russian maxim is transport connectivity. Here Azerbaijan is indispensable. The International North-South Transport Corridor is not only a commercial project; it is an element of Russia’s adaptation to a world in which Western-controlled routes, financial systems and maritime passages can no longer be treated as neutral. In Baku, Putin said the North-South project would allow Russia and Azerbaijan to reach “the shores of the Indian Ocean” and use these routes for mutual benefit. This is a strategic sentence. It shows why roads, railways, ports, customs infrastructure and Caspian logistics are now part of security policy.
The North-South corridor connects Russia with Azerbaijan, Iran, the Persian Gulf and India. It also gives Azerbaijan a wider role as the hinge between North-South and East-West routes. A stable, sovereign Azerbaijan is thus not a tactical convenience for Moscow; it is a structural requirement for Eurasian logistics. That is why Russian policy will continue to prioritize practical agreements with Baku on transit, customs, ports, rail capacity, energy and regional security.
The third maxim is to work with sovereignist political leaderships in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Russia has learned that ideological formulas with unclear meanings such as “European choice” can become instruments for outside leverage. Moscow can build more durable relations with governments that define policy through national interest, territorial integrity and regional balance. Azerbaijan fits this logic most clearly. In 2022, Putin said the Declaration on Allied Interaction “marks the transition” of Russian-Azerbaijani relations “to a qualitatively new level.” The declaration itself states that the two countries build relations on mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference and the pursuit of independent foreign policies aimed at protecting national interests.
This is why Azerbaijan’s leading regional role should be recognized explicitly. Aliyev has said that “the South Caucasus is our region” and that Azerbaijan, as the leading country in the area, has a special responsibility. Putin, for his part, has stressed that Russia attaches great importance to multifaceted friendly relations with Azerbaijan based on equality, consideration of each other’s interests and close human and cultural ties. Azerbaijan as viewed from Russia is predictable, culturally understandable, economically useful and politically sovereign. These qualities make it one of Moscow’s most important regional partners.
Georgia should be approached through the same prism. Tbilisi’s internal politics are different, and the unresolved Russian-Georgian agenda remains serious. Yet Georgia’s transit function and its interest in avoiding external pressure make pragmatic engagement possible. The 3+3 framework should remain open to Georgia not as a demand for alignment, but as an invitation to regional responsibility.
The fourth maxim is balance between Iran and Türkiye. Iran is a direct neighbor of the South Caucasus and an essential participant in North-South connectivity. Türkiye is a NATO member, which naturally creates caution in Moscow. Yet Putin has also noted that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pursues an independent foreign policy. That independence matters: it allows Russia and Türkiye to manage competition without turning every disagreement into a bloc confrontation.
Russia’s strategic objectives in the South Caucasus can therefore be stated without ambiguity: defend the 3+3 logic; prevent Armenia from becoming a platform for external political penetration; support transport corridors that strengthen non-Western logistics; deepen allied interaction with Azerbaijan and pragmatic engagement with Georgia; and balance relations with Iran and Türkiye as indispensable regional powers.
