In the region of "Eurasian Balkans" (Brzezinski, 1997), one can perceive a deep continuity between the 19th century age of empire and 21st century geopolitics. In what seems like a re-run of the first "great game", the 19th century imperial rivalry between the British Empire and Tsarist Russia, powerful players once again position themselves to control the heart of the Eurasian landmass, left in a post-Soviet power vacuum. Today, the United States has taken over the leading role from the British. Along with the ever-present Russians, new regional powers such as European Union (EU), China, Iran, Turkey and India have entered the arena, and transactional oil corporations are also pursuing their own interests.
For states involved in global political and economic processes, one of the key problems is to put up a geopolitical strategy in the battle to dominate the famous "Heartland" in Helford MacKinder's theory developed at the beginning of the 20th century. In spite of their low level of economic development, countries of "Eurasian Balkans" have an important geo-economic potential.
Within this territory of "Heartland" dear to MacKinder, exist one part which is not negligible to all the present and future superpowers and which we could call, to paraphrase MacKinder, the "Caucasusland".
South Caucasus (Iberia in the epochs of the Hellenistic and Roman empires) forms an important geopolitical center - axis. It has been considered throughout history as kind of a bridge between Europe and Asia. For the Europeans and the Americans, the access to Central and East Asia on land is conditioned by some transport infrastructure and military instalments in one or some of the Caucasus countries, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. For Russia and regional powers, these countries are significant militarily and economically since they are members of the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) and were during more than a hundred years subject of the Russian tsarist Empire.
In the present day, Russia, as well as China, India, Iran and Turkey is making concerted moves to gain influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus to stem growing U.S. and EU influence in the region. There is an evolving alliance, in particular between Russia, China, and India. These countries are all nuclear powers, all grappling with Islamic extremism and all deeply concerned about what they see as the unilateralism of the U.S.A. and its doctrine of pre-emption through the use of massive forces and, if necessary, nuclear weapons. It is important to note that Moscow signed a treaty of friendship with Beijing in July 2001. Prior to this, Russia, China, and four Central Asian states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan - created the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to facilitate multilateral efforts at stemming Islamic fundamentalism and to promote regional economic development. All this pointed to a profound geopolitical transformation for the Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia and China, with Moscow and Beijing as the decision makers in the region.
Although several nations are vying to assert influence in an area of growing strategic importance, it is Moscow's new drive to reassert itself in the region that defines the emerging potential for confrontation with the United States. In October 2003, Russia opened an air base outside Bishkek - its first military installation abroad since the 1991 Soviet collapse. The Kant air base reasserted, symbolically at least, Russia's military influence in a traditionally turbulent region that many in Moscow fear is being absorbed into the U.S. orbit. Kremlin's moves are no threat to the U.S. regional presence but they underscore the deep suspicions harboured by Moscow of U.S. intentions. But if the US's true motivation were really to seal the American cold war victory against Russia, to contain Chinese influence, which is currently small, and to tighten the noose around Iran, its investment of money and military effort would be far larger.
China also is exerting influence on Central Asia. Recently the Kyrgyz government added five groups to its list of terrorist organizations - some of which until now have only been considered a threat by Beijing. China is also involved in Kazakhstan's biggest oil-pipeline project. It's an attractive partnership for both sides. China will get the oil it needs, and Kazakhstan will get the $9 billion it requires for building the pipeline. China looks at oil and gas as very strategic commodities -- every country does. For China, Kazakhstan is an attractive potential source of oil that could come over land, which they see -- especially the Chinese military -- as being less vulnerable to being cut off.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union Eurasia and the Caucasus has become a region of diversified international interests, different civilisations and diverging paths of political development. The evolving identity of post-Soviet Russia within this new context is that, while both Russia and Eurasia will continue to exist, they can no longer be considered synonymous as during the Soviet empire. Russia has not only lost its position as the centre of gravity in the region but also will not be able to reassert itself as a dominant geopolitical power. Simply, Russia has lost the economic resources to attract this region in its sole sphere of influence. It will have to realize, the sooner the better, that it is living, after the communist debacle, in a process of marginalization -- and possibly disintegration -- in the world affairs.
Russia's geopolitical interests are too dispersed considering its means and the international community has become too globalized for the dominance option. Russia has not the capability to re-emerge as a major power in a multipolar world. For example, we contend that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) will not serve as an instrument for future Russian integration. Instead, the historical role of the CIS has been to keep the nostalgia for a new Russian empire at bay by providing the illusion of reintegration. The reality is that member states of the CIS, and particularly Caucasus states with the exception of Armenia, have become increasingly more independent.
There are strong indications that Russia is becoming a 'petrostate' -- an oil-rich country that is plagued by weak institutions, a poorly functioning public sector and a high concentration of power and wealth concentrated in the hands of a few. When oil revenues flood a nation that has a weak system of democratic checks and balances, dysfunctional politics and economics ensue. A strong democracy and an effective public sector help explain why oil has not distorted Norway the way it has Nigeria or Venezuela. A lot of oil, combined with weak public institutions, fuels poverty, inequality and corruption. It also undermines democracy. The massive gap between a petrostate's rich natural resources and the chronic poverty of its citizens often leads to political unrest and frustration.
Although the oil sector generates export revenues and taxes for the Russian government, it creates few jobs. The inevitable concentration of the energy sector into the hands of a few large companies gives a handful of corporate owners enormous political clout. In turn, corruption often thrives. It is no accident that Moscow's current political crisis involves control of the Yukos oil giant and the arrest of its former CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovskii.
To compensate for the economic and political weaknesses that plague all countries where oil is the biggest industry and the most potent political force, will we see in Russia a strong, independent public sector tempered by the checks and balances of a truly democratic system? This question will remain open for probably many more years, especially after the December 7th legislative elections.
Following the 11September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Washington has boosted its presence in the former Soviet Union, setting up military bases in Central Asia and launching a $64 million program to train Georgian Army units in antiterrorist techniques. The US deployed its first military forces in the Caucasus with the introduction of the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) in April 2002 to enable Tbilisi to secure its borders and contribute to the war against terrorism. The United States sees stability in areas bordering Russia to the south as essential to its own security and to its regional oil projects. The Caucasus is frequently a point of transit for the United States military and other flights supporting operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other destinations in the Middle East.
Despite these efforts, Washington is unable to settle the conflicts that broke out in the post-Soviet space on its own and must therefore rely on Russia. America has the option to notably delegate its functions to Russia with regard to the settlement of the most serious conflicts that exist in the post-Soviet space. This of course goes for the conflict in Georgia with Abkhazia, Adjaria and South Ossetia and for the Transdniester dispute in Moldova. Today it is obvious that these conflicts cannot be sorted out without external intervention, that none of them can be settled on its own. Russia will likely have to act in coordination with the U.S. within a global framework that will meet America's interests and not contradict them.
The recent 'Revolution of the Roses' in Georgia has compelled the US government and other states and international organisations to begin to rethink some of their policies in the Caucasus. Despite considerable US investment, Georgia achieved neither democracy nor prosperity, and Washington is looking to craft new policies for more effective use of the resources expended in the area.
The battle between the weakened central state of Georgia and its emboldened regions could precipitate a return to the "warlordism" and violence of a decade ago under the presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. And although Georgia's geopolitical importance - both as a "transit state" for the export of Caspian hydrocarbons and as a frontline state in the global "war on terrorism" - remains constant, its current internal fragility could ultimately negate that strategic value. Thus the next stage in Georgia's difficult transition lies outside of the capital, but holds the key to the future of the country as a whole. On the positive side, the United States and Russia no longer conduct a zero-sum relationship in the southern Caucasus, and it is possible to craft a policy of constructive relations with both Moscow and Washington. Still we have to recognize that while Washington seeks a Western-oriented, democratic Georgia, Moscow wants Tbilisi in its sphere of influence.
The Republic of Georgia, despite its lack of economic resources and small population, has strategic geopolitical significance - by virtue of its location, the republic is afforded control of transport lines to the entire southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Georgia is likely to become an important transit state of major export pipelines of Caspian oil and gas - the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline. The Caucasus is then a crossroads for more than energy pipelines, and the international community has a vested interest in its security, stability, and prosperity. Russian-American cooperation on energy and broader issues will continue in the Caucasus, but the content and the quality of the relationship will really depend on how Russia behaves in Georgia.
The Bush administration has used the war on terror for a massive military build-up in Central Asia, dramatically altering the geo-strategic power equations in the region. Washington seeks to seal the American cold war victory against Russia, to contain Chinese influence, and to tighten the noose around Iran.
As early as 1997, President Clinton's assistant secretary of state Strobe Talbott argued that, were the Caspian region to fall into the hands of religious or political extremists, it would matter profoundly to the US if that were to happen in an area that sits on as much as two hundred billion barrels of oil.
The preoccupation of the United States in Central Asia is to prevent the spread of terrorism while encouraging democracy. The Central Asian republics live in a much more dangerous neighbourhood than the Maghreb nations, for example. Afghanistan, with all its troubles, is an immediate neighbour. There is also Pakistan, with its volatility, and Iran, with its unsolved struggle between religious conservatives and reformists.
Washington is aware that while both the Maghreb and Central Asia are historically Muslim, the longer-established Islam of North Africa is more deeply rooted. And Washington contends that, like everywhere else, interest in extremism in Central Asia seems to decline with improving economic conditions. For instance, Kazakhstan is a country that has a gross domestic product which grew by 11 percent last year. It has grown by two-digit figures for the last couple of years. It started from a very low point, but it is growing fast, and it is primarily as a result of investment in its oil and gas sectors. So a country like Kazakhstan, which is doing relatively well, has not seen so much interest expressed among the general public for Islamist kind of ideas. Consequently, for Washington it is a question of how to achieve progress economically.
But most of the countries of the region are failing to make themselves attractive for foreign, particularly Western, investment. Turkmenistan has turned away from Western investment and is instead implementing a paranoid foreign policy that drives it back toward Russia and Ukraine, where the prices it obtains for its energy resources are often below world market levels.
Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, is turning toward China as a regional 'savior' and is trying to develop its trade links eastward, rather than westward. The region places store on developing economic ties with the European Union, but - like the Maghreb - these will take time to bear fruit.
Before the campaign started by the U.S. in October 2001, Central Asia was a region that had been historically part of the Russian empire or the Soviet Union, a region that was totally dependent on Russia in many aspects of life, that was militarily under the Russian sphere of influence, and economically totally dependent on trade with Russia. This changed after 11 September. The region suddenly found itself on the front lines of the U.S.-led international campaign against terrorism, which began with the fight against Al-Qaeda forces and their Taliban hosts in neighboring Afghanistan.
Less than two weeks after the terrorist attacks in the U.S., Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev, one of Russia's staunchest allies, opened his country to the U.S. and its allies in the antiterror war. Russia initially resisted such participation by the nations of Central Asia. In the early days after the attack in September, the Russian government declared that there would be no international force, U.S.-led forces, in bases in Central Asian countries. But they quickly backtracked on that, which is an example of Russia's downgrading in international politics, and since that time Russian President Vladimir Putin has pursued a line of cooperation.
In sum, the main spoils in today's great game are the Caspian energy reserves, principally oil and gas. On its shores, and at the bottom of the Caspian Sea, lie the world's biggest untapped fossil fuel resources. Estimates range from 110 to 243 billion barrels of crude, worth up to $4 trillion. According to the US Department of Energy, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan alone could sit on more than 130 billion barrels, more than three times the United States' reserves.
In industrialised countries' energy ministries, what would be the last oil rush in world history has evoked a sense of euphoria. Democratic governments are courting corrupt, ex-communist Caspian potentates, while energy companies have signed lucrative contracts and invested more than thirty billion dollars in new production facilities.
"I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian," declared Dick Cheney in a speech to oil industrialists in Washington D.C. in 1998. Now US vice-president, Cheney was then still CEO of the oil service giant Halliburton. In May 2001, he recommended in the National Energy Policy report that "the President make energy security a priority of our trade and foreign policy", singling out the Caspian basin as a "rapidly growing new area of supply".
With a potential oil production of up to six million barrels per day by 2015, the Caspian region and the Caucasus have become crucial to the United States' policy of "diversifying energy supply" as well as to Russia's economic recovery and future development. Regional powers will try to have their say as much as possible and China is just about to enter this today's 'great game'.